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Renewed Efficiency in Administrative
Patent Revocation
Saurabh Vishnubhakaf
ABSTRACT: Administrative patent revocation in the U.S. is poised to enter
a new period of efficiency, though ironically it will be an efficiency that the
America Invents Act originallyput in place. The Court's recent approvalof
the constitutionality of Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB")
proceedings was blunted by the Court's accompanying rejection of partial
institution. This Patent Office practice of accepting and denying validity
review petitions piecemeal had been a key part of the agency's procedural
structurefrom the start. As a result, the Court's decision in SAS Institute v.
Iancu to require a binary choice-eitherfully accepting a PTAB petition or
fully denying it-is already being criticizedfor sacrificing efficiency on the
altar of wooden statutory interpretation, including two dissents from the
decision itself Startingfrom the premise that SAS Institute was rightly
decided, however, this paper makes two contributions. The theoretical
contribution is to contrast PTAB estoppel with ordinary principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. This important context is lacking in the
literature, and the profound effect of SAS Institute on PTAB estoppel makes
this evaluation especially timely. The empirical contribution is to marshal
new data and guide the difficult structuralchoices that the agency must now
make in order to comply with SAS Institute. Notably, though justice
Ginsburg's dissent suggested that the agency could comply with the Court's
decision through afew empty gestures, her mock proposal is actually a sound
plan of action. By reinvigoratingCongress's view of efficiency, one that is
more systemic than merely minimizing short-term agency workload, the Court
has enabled the Patent Office to resolve open questions about the maturing

*
Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law; Associate Professor, Texas
A&M University Dwight Look College of Engineering; Fellow, Duke Law Center for Innovation
Policy; former Expert Advisor, United States Patent and Trademark Office. The arguments in
this writing are the author's and should not be imputed to the USPTO or to any other
organization. Sincere thanks to Bryan Choi, John Duffy, Brian Holland, Dmitry Karshtedt, Jay
Kesan, Megan La Belle, Mark Lemley, Adam Kelly, Adam Mossoff, David O'Brien, Lisa Ouellette,
Tanya Pierce, Arti Rai, Josh Sarnoff, Stefani Shanberg, Jonathan Stroud, Chris Walker, and
participants at the 2018 Iowa Law Review Symposium, the Ohio State Law Faculty Summer
Workshop Series, and the 2o18 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference for helpful comments.

2643

IOWA LAWREVIEW

2644

[VOL 104:2643

system for resolving patent validity through administrative, rather than
judicial, process.
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INTRODUCTION

More than six years since Congress empowered the Patent and
Trademark Office ("Patent Office") to reevaluate and revoke issued patents
through administrative trials, the agency continues to seek an efficient
structure for its system of review. Although administrative review of patent
validity has existed in other forms since 1980, the 2011 America Invents Act
("AIA") created the first truly adversarial agency trial proceedings that could
act as credible substitutes for the federal courts in adjudicating patent
validity.' Court-agency substitution is a central feature of all three ALA
proceedings: inter partes review, covered business method review, and postgrant review. 2 What makes these substitutes attractive are several salient
differences from judicial process.
Modem Patent Office review is intended to make it systematically easier
to invalidate patents generally-so that patents of questionable quality will be
more likely to fall. For example, patent validity review under the AIA has no

1. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., StrategicDecisionMaking in DualPTAB and District Court
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 50-64 (2016) (summarizing the history of ex post
administrative review prior to, and under, the AIA).
2. Id. at 64-81 (discussing court-agency substitution through AIA proceedings).
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standing requirement, unlike court proceedings under Article 111.3 AIA
reviews also allow patents to be revoked by a preponderance of evidence
rather than by clear and convincing evidence, as courts demand.4 And before
deciding whether a patent is so broad as to be invalid, AIA reviews assumed
until recently that the patent has broader scope than it would in litigation.5
Indeed, AIA proceedings have been so successful at their intended purpose
that the very idea of supplanting the primacy of Article III courts has provoked
fundamental constitutional disputes about who can properly revoke vested
patent rights.6 Last Term, the Supreme Court resolved the major
constitutional dispute in favor of allowing Patent Trial and Appeal Board
("PTAB") review to continue.7

Amid the grander debate, however, a quieter structural struggle has also
been unfolding. Its focus is the efficient administration of Patent Office
proceedings under the AIA and the agency's control over its own docket as
both a policy lever and a case management lever. The agency's PTAB, which
conducts all three types of reviews,' has important institutional features that
reflect how the agency has tried to fulfill its mandate from Congress and what
normative choices it has made along the way. And in this more specific
controversy, the Court in SAS Institute v. Iancu upended a cornerstone of
PTAB administration-partial institution.9
Before SAS Institute, the PTAB did not always just institute or deny a
petition for review. It routinely chose a third way, instituting petitions in part
and denying them in part. The Patent Office view on this matter was
straightforward. The authorizing statute was ambiguous about the criteria for
instituting review, and the ability to pick and choose among patent claims
arguments in a petition was a commonsense lever for efficiency. The power
of partial institution let the PTAB focus on the most relevant and meritorious
arguments, dispense up front with unavailing arguments, and proceed to trial
3.

See 35 U.S.C. § 31 1 (a)

(2012);

Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found.,

753 F. 3 d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
4. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 3 16(e) (allowing patents to be revoked after an inter partes review
proceeding upon a showing of preponderance of the evidence), with Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (201 1) (holding that asserting patent invalidity as a defense to
infringement requires clear and convincing evidence).
5. See 37 C.F.R. § 4 2.1oo(b) (2012); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 1 3 6 S. Ct. 2131,
2136 (2016). The Patent Office in late 2018 changed this broader standard for claim
construction and aligned it with the interpretive approach that governs in infringement
litigation. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.10o(b) (2018).
6. Seegenerally Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365
(2018) (questioning whether the PTAB has the authority to revoke a patent through inter partes
review); see also generally MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F. 3 d 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (rejecting the argument that interpartes review violates the Constitution), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 292 (2016).

7.
8.
9.

Oil States, 1 3 8 S. Ct. at 1379.
35 U.S.C. § 6 (including reexaminations, derivation proceedings, and interpartesreviews).
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, I 3 8 S. Ct. 1348, 1359-60 (2018).
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as well as final judgment more quickly. This last point is especially important
to case management, as the ALA imposes a deadline for PTAB reviews to
conclude.-o

As a result, the Court's reversal in SAS Institute-forbidding partial
institution-has already received much criticism for sacrificing efficiency on
the altar of wooden statutory interpretation." The Court's opinion drew two
dissents, including a brief and important rejoinder by Justice Ginsburg and
joined byJustices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan., While detractors of the SAS
Institutedecision may have reasonable quarrels with the outcome, the charge
of inefficiency is largely misplaced. In particular, Justice Ginsburg's mock
proposal to illustrate a "uselessly" duplicative route that the Patent Office
could take to neutralize the impact of SAS Institute is actually a sound
approach that would yield meaningful systemic benefits.'3
Ending partial institutions was the reasonable and appropriate thing for
the Court to do. The majority opinion marks a return to the efficiencies that
Congress actually put in place when it made the Patent Office into a
meaningful substitute for the federal courts. Part II elucidates an aberration
in PTAB estoppel, which departs from traditional principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. This aberration lies at the heart of the AIA's system
for patent revocation and animated the controversy over partial institution.
Part III connects this aberration to the SAS Institute dispute and the
Court's answer. Next is the aftermath of SAS Institute, including Patent Office
guidance issued shortly after the decision and the incentives that are likely to
drive both litigant behavior and agency behavior in currently pending cases
where partial institution must now be corrected.
Part IV zooms out to evaluate the empirical scope of partial institution
over its six-year lifespan, discussing operational data on how aggressively the
PTAB managed its docket before SAS Institute. The data reveals that,
depending on how the agency implements the Court's decision, its workload
going forward could rise substantially even if the incoming body of petitions
were the same, though this is also unlikely given the effects on petitioner and
patent owner incentives. Next is an earnest appraisal of Justice Ginsburg's
suggestion in her rejoinder on the SAS Institute opinion, which was offered as
a straw man, but offers real benefits. The discussion concludes by addressing
important open questions that are now likely to receive renewed attention
from the Federal Circuit in the near future.

10.

it.
12.

13.

U.S.C.§§ 3 16(a)(11),326(a)(11).
SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
35
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THE PRECLUSION PARADOX IN PATENT OFFICE REVOCATION

The animating principle of patent revocation under the AIA is a basic
tradeoff. Petitioners who wish to challenge a patent's validity can do so in an
agency forum that is more accessible, affordable, expeditious, and expert than
the Article III courts.'4 Patent owners, meanwhile, are to be insulated from
relitigation of their patents.'1 For example, it would not be appropriate that a
patent owner that successfully defends its patent in the PTAB should have a
court invalidate it anyway. Similarly, a challenger that fails to invalidate a
patent in the PTAB should not be permitted simply to bring another PTAB
case against the same patent repeating the same arguments. In short, the
familiar procedural virtues that judgments should have finality, resources
should be conserved, and prevailing parties should have repose are all as
relevant for agency proceedings as for the court proceedings they replace.
A.

PTAB ESTOPPELAND ITS ABERRATION

The AIA mediates this tradeoff primarily through a set of statutory
estoppel provisions. Estoppel is a feature of all three PTAB validity review
systems and applies to future proceedings both in the Patent Office and in
other fora, including the U.S. district courts and the U.S. International Trade
Commission. However, the peculiar doctrinal details of PTAB estoppel
deviate fundamentally from traditional principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. As a result, PTAB estoppel paradoxically undermines the
very substitutionary purpose that the PTAB was intended to serve. The PTAB
practice of partial institutions simply aggravated the problem and led to a
variety of further systemic distortions.
Estoppel is strategically essential to administrative revocation under the
AIA. A final written decision by the PTAB in interpartes review or in post-grant
review bars the petitioner in a future proceeding from raising not only the
same grounds but also other grounds that the petitioner reasonably could
have raised (but did not) during the original agency proceeding.' 6 Moreover,
not only is the petitioner itself estopped, but so is any real party in interest or
privy of the petitioner.7 In covered business method review, the estoppel is
only slightly softer: It applies to future PTAB proceedings but not to future
civil actions and other proceedings.,8 Real parties in interest and privies
remain on the hook.'9 This framework creates an aberrant hybrid estoppel
that combines features of resjudicata and collateral estoppel.

Vishnubhakat et al., supranote 1, at 47-50.

15.

Id. at 5 8- 5 9
35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) (2012).
Id.
Id. § 325(e); Leahy-SmithAmerica Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(i) (A), 125

16.
17.
I8.

.

14.

Stat. 283, 329 (2011).

19.

35 U.S.C. § 325(e); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a) (i) (A).
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Both forms of preclusion require a final judgment on the merits in the
first case.2 o Resjudicata further requires that the second case present the same
claim or cause of action that the first case resolved.21 Although doctrinal
specifics vary byjurisdiction, two claims are generally considered the same for
resjudicata purposes if they arise out of the same transaction (i.e., the same
relevant facts): "whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage."22 The parties must also be the same from the first
action to the second, though this is a pragmatic inquiry as well: Nonparties to
the first action may be bound if their interests were adequately represented.23
As a result, because the claims and parties are the same, all relevant arguments
from the first case-whether actually raised or not-are deemed foreclosed.
Collateral estoppel cuts more narrowly but more deeply than resjudicata.
Rather than foreclose relitigation of a whole case, it reaches only specific
issues within the first case, such as individual elements of a prima facie claim
or relevant questions of fact.24 These issues can be barred from reassertion
not only in the same claim but also in different, unrelated claims.25 However,
to be precluded, the issue in dispute must have been essential to the first
judgment.2 6
PTAB estoppel combines these features in a peculiar way.27 Petitioners
who lose in the PTAB, with respect to a claim in a patent,2 8 lose the ability to
raise "any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised"29
from that first case in any subsequent case, whether in the PTAB again or in
a civil action or ITC proceeding.3o Privies and real parties in interest are
estopped as well.3' This appears on its face to be a straightforward codification
of res judicata. It deals throughout with requests for a declaration of patent

20.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS

21.

Id. §2 4 ().
Id. § 24(2).
Id. H 34 ,41.

22.

23.

§ 17 (AM. LAw INsT. 1982).

Id.§ 17(3); see also id. § 17 cmt. c.
Id. § 27.
Id.
26.
27. The potential for confusion over whether PTAB estoppel is a species of resjudicata or
of collateral estoppel was the subject of a recent panel presentation by Megan La Belle. See Project
on the Foundations of Private Law, The Administrative-PrivateLaw Interface in IP Conference: Panel
3: The Limits of Preclusion and Deference, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=J-NbgzKDqro (beginning at 13:50, remarks of Megan La Belle).
28.
This use of "claim" is specific to patents, which contain a series of individual statements
about particular embodiments of the invention that the patent covers. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
(2012). It is not synonymous with "claim" in the procedural sense of litigation.
29.
Id.§§315(e)(1),325(e)(1).
24.
25.

30.

31.

Id. §§ 315(e) (2), 325(e)(2).
Id. H 315(e), 325(e).
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invalidity. It binds only parties or those who share closely connected interests.
And it forecloses all available arguments, both those actually raised and those
that reasonably could have been raised.
However, doctrinal elements of collateral estoppel are present as well.
Although the three PTAB proceedings under the AIA all differ in how they
handle requests for patent invalidation, they are all equally concerned with
the overall issue of whether the patent is valid. Whereas post-grant review
applies only to patents issued subject to the first-inventor-to-file, provisions of
the AIA went into effect2 and covered business method review is limited to
certain data processing-related inventions,33 both proceedings allow a patent
to be challenged as to all major legal grounds of patentability. The same is not
true of inter partes review, which allows challenges based only on two legal
grounds: that the invention lacks novelty or that the invention is obvious.34

Similarly, interpartesreview allows only certain kinds of evidence-patents and
printed publications-in support of a validity challenge, while post grant
review and covered business method reviews have no such limitation.35 Thus,
it is unclear at what level of generality to define the issue that may be
precluded: patentability in general, or a particular ground. Outside the PTAB,
civil actions and ITC proceedings allow an even wider range of legal claims
and causes of action in which arguments about invalidity may arise.36
In short, the relevant transactional facts that define PTAB claims for res
judicata purposes can vary considerably, even though they may all be
concerned generally with patent invalidity. PTAB estoppel applies to all of
these different contexts alike, suggesting a collateral estoppel-like depth of
reach. However, unlike common-law collateral estoppel, the issue in dispute
need not have been essential to the initial PTAB judgment on which estoppel
will be based. Indeed, the issue need not even have been raised.
B.

WHY PTAB ESTOPPELIS PROBLEMATIC

Understandably, then, petitioners who mount patent challenges in the
PTAB are quite resistant to treat the agency review process as an actual
substitute, for the strategic benefit of investing in the strongest possible set of
arguments for today's PTAB review could well be outweighed by the strategic
cost of squandering those arguments in a single PTAB review that might turn
out to fail. For example, say a challenger considering inter partes review could
conduct a basic search and discover prior art Reference A or, alternatively,

Id. § 321(c); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
32.
6(f)(2)(A), 125 Stat 284, 293, 311 (2011).
33. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(d) (1).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 3 1i(b).
35. Id.§§311(b),321.
36. Id. § 282(b)-(c).

112-29,

H§ 3(n)(1),

2650
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could conduct a more extensive and costly search and discover prior art
References A and B.
For estoppel purposes, the strategic choice is whether to invest more now
in inter partes review or to conserve resources for a future proceeding. If
discovered today, References A and B could both be asserted-indeed, would
have to be asserted or else lost-in support of the current interpartes review. If
the challenge succeeded, then the matter would be settled, at least as to the
relevant patent claims. But if it failed, then estoppel would bar the assertion
of both pieces of prior art in any subsequent case, even a subsequent case
involving a different cause of action but the same issue.
By contrast, investing in merely a basic search today, and discovering and
asserting only Reference A in the current interpartes review, would leave open
an option that if the current inter partes review failed, then additional
resources might still uncover Reference B for a future case. Under this
approach, because Reference B was not known to the challenger at the time
of the first PTAB challenge, there is at least room to argue that Reference B
was not a ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised
(i.e., that Reference B is not subject to estoppel in the future). Ultimately, the
decision whether estoppel applies or not will turn on whether the adjudicator
in the second case agrees that the challenger should have known about
Reference B. The problem, therefore, is that there may be strategic incentive
for the challenger to punt on this question and force a difficult adjudicatory
decision later based on limited information.
In short, a balance must be struck. Investing less in today's PTAB
challenge leaves options for the future in case today's challenge ends in
defeat, but investing less also makes today's challenge that much more likely
to end in defeat. Thus, the effect of hybrid estoppel in the PTAB is that PTAB
reviews that were intended as a substitute for judicial process, and whose
estoppel provisions were crafted with the same intent, may nevertheless result
in the opposite effect. The petitioner, rather than make its best case the first
time around, may be better served in many situations by making only a secondbest case, frustrating the AIA's substitutionary goals of finality, repose, and
minimizing duplication.
Partial institution made the problem considerably worse. Because this
practice allowed some legal grounds, factual grounds, or both to be excluded
from the proceeding that the petitioner had sought, it added another layer of
uncertainty to estoppel. In addition to worrying whether it would be better to
invest in making all possible arguments today or to preserve option value for
the future, petitioners had to worry how grounds asserted in the petition but
excluded from the merits' adjudication would be treated by a later tribunal.
Would the later tribunal hold that these grounds had been raised
because they were asserted in the petition, or would their non-institution be
enough to exempt these grounds from estoppel? If a petitioner omitted such
grounds in the first place based on expectations about what the PTAB would
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partially accept or deny anyway, would the later tribunal nevertheless hold
that these grounds reasonably could have been raised, or would reliance on
PTAB precedent be enough to exempt these grounds from estoppel?
SAS INSTITUTE AND ITS AFTERMATH

III.

These uncertainties were no idle theoretical speculation but came before
the PTAB and Federal Circuit in multiple cases during the early years of AIA
review. Even in cases where the Federal Circuit purported to resolve certain
aspects of the problem,s7 the cases often arose in odd procedural postures or
came as split panel decisions that kept the underlying jurisprudential debate
alive.38
A.

PARTIAL INSTITUTION AND ESTOPPEL

The problems of partial institution and its estoppel effects were at the
heart of SAS Institute v. Iancu, which began as an inter partes review by SAS
against a software-related patent held by ComplementSoft.39 Although the
SAS petition alleged that all sixteen claims of the patent were invalid, the
PTAB instituted review as to patent "claims i and 3-10," denying institution
as to the rest.4o Based on the decision to institute, which the AIA makes "final
and non-appealable,"41 the PTAB held a trial and issued a final written
decision addressing the claims on which it had instituted review.4 SAS
appealed, arguing that it was entitled to "a final written decision with respect
to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner"-and
that this included every claim challenged in the petition.43 ComplementSoft
declined to defend its victory beyond the Federal Circuit, and the Patent
Office intervened.44
The Patent Office argued that it was required to issue final written
decisions only as to those patent claims on which it had instituted review.45 In
other words, the agency claimed that it could define its statutory obligations
for itself by making partial institutions. Moreover, relying on the Supreme
Court's 2016 decision in Cuozzo v. Lee, the Patent Office also argued that its

See, e.g., Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F. 3 d 1293, 1305 (Fed.
37.
Cir. 2016) ("[T]he lack of a reasoned basis [in a PTO decision] deprive[d] [any] future tribunals
of the necessary basis to determine whether estoppel should apply.").
See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Non-Doctrine ofRedundancy, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777,
38.
792-93 (2019) (discussing Judge Reyna's departure from the panel majority in Shaw Industries
and the competing analysis that his concurring opinion set forth).
40.

SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2o18).
Id.

41.

3 5

42.

SAS Inst., 1 3 8 S. CL at 1354.

43.

Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (emphasis added)).

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 1355-

39.

U.S.C. § 31 4 (d); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 1 3 6 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).

2652
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nonappealable discretion to institute or not placed the entire dispute over
partial institution outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts to review at
all.4 6 This extraordinarily broad view of agency autonomy reveals how
important a building block partial institution was to the adjudicatory
apparatus of the PTAB. 47
Indeed, it had been this way from the start. The power to make binary
decisions was in the statutory text of the AIA itself, which referred to "[t]he
determination by the Director whether to institute . . . review."4 8 The
supposedly lesser-included power to make partial decisions rested primarily
on the syntax of the institution criterion. In the case of inter partes review,
"[tihe Director may not authorize ...

unless ...

there is a reasonable

likelihood" of success as to at least one challenged patent claim.49 For postgrant and covered business method review, "[t] he Director may not authorize
... unless" there is a preponderance of success as to at least one challenged
patent claim.5o
The "may not/unless" framing meant that likelihood of eventual success
was clearly a necessary condition to institute review, but it was unsettled
whether this was also a sufficient condition. Moreover, the need to find a
likelihood of success "with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged"
potentially meant that institution called for claim-by-claim evaluation and
selection.5' In this, the Patent Office saw ambiguities and resolved them by
concluding that likelihood of success is not a sufficient condition, and that
textual support for claim-by-claim analysis permitted the agency to proceed
piecemeal, on "all or some" of the claims challenged and grounds asserted.52
The Court in SAS Instituteheld, however, that the textual structure of the
AIA is unambiguous as to the binary nature of the institution power.53 And
even if likelihood of success is not a sufficient condition, said the Court, there
is no warrant in the statute for claim-by-claim agency curation of the case. The
Court explained that the statute's text does not require each claim be
examined separately but instead to decide whether at least one claim will
succeed and that "a reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies
review of all."54 Central to this conclusion was the substitutionary purpose of

46. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 12-13, SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1348 (No. 16-969), 2017
WL 3948437, at *12-13.
47. See generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Porous Court-Agency Border in Patent Law, 51
AKRON L. REv. 1069 (2017) (providing detailed criticism of progressively broader Patent Office
interpretations of the PTAB nonappealability provisions, including and especially the agency's
position in SAS Institute).
48- 35 U.S.C. H 311 4 (d), 324(e) (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 314(a).
50. Id. § 324(a).
51. Id. H§ 314(a), 324(a).
37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108, 42.208 (2018).
52.
53. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (2018).
54. Id. at 13 5 6.
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PTAB review to stand in for federal courts. "Much as in the civil litigation
system it mimics," the Court explained, "in an interpartesreview the petitioner
is master of its complaint and normally entitled to judgment on all of the
claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address."55
The Court similarly dispatched arguments connecting partial institution
to the ultimate question of final written decisions, concluding that partial
institution is outside the agency's powers under the statute and that a final
written decision must, indeed, address every claim challenged in the
petition.5 6 Importantly, the Court also held as a threshold matter that the
nonappealability of PTAB institution decisions does not shield ultra vires
practices such as partial institution, thus placing a further limit on the Court's
earlier decision in Cuozzo.57 This point is of particular salience to open

questions that are now likely to come before the Federal Circuit, as discussed
in Part IV.5 8

The opinion of the Court drew two dissents. The lengthier dissent came
from Justice Breyer arguing point by point against Justice Gorsuch's textual
analysis for the majority.59 Of particular relevance to efficient administration
in the PTAB, however, was a one-paragraph dissent from Justice Ginsburg
rejecting what she termed the majority's "wooden reading" of the statute.6o
She suggested instead that the PTAB could easily restore its past practice of
filtering unmeritorious arguments through an additional formalistic step,
rendering the majority opinion little more than a requirement for "the Board
to spend its time ... uselessly." 6' As Part IV explains, Justice Ginsburg's mock
proposal is actually a sound plan and would offer significant benefits in both
6
the short and long term. 2

Now that the Court has issued its decision and partial institution is no
longer available to the Patent Office, three important strategic questions have
arisen about the incentives both of the litigants and of the agency. 6 3 First is

the question of how the PTAB will treat future petitions seeking review. 64
Second is how the PTAB will treat the cases that were pending when SAS
Institutewas decided, where the agency made partial institutions and must now

55.
56.

Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1359-60.

57.

Id. at

1359-

58. See infra Section IV.C.
59. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1360-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6o. Id. at 1360 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. See infra Section IV.B.
63. The discussion throughout the rest of this Part draws heavily from a blog commentary
just after SAS Institute was decided. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, First Steps After SAS Institute,
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 27, 2o8), https://patentlyo.com/patent/201 8/o 4 /first-steps-institute.html.
64. Id.
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correct that error. 65 Third and finally is how litigants are likely to respond to
the changed agency landscape that now awaits them.66
B.

FUTURE PETTIONS AFTER SAS INSTITUTE

Two days after the decision in SAS Institute, the Patent Office issued its
Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings laying out the agency's
policy for coming into compliance with the decision.6 7 Going forward, "the
PTAB will institute as to all claims or none"-with no partial institution.68
Where the PTAB does institute review, it "will institute on all challenges raised
in the petition." 6 9
It is remarkable that the guidance goes beyond what SAS Institute seems
to require, which in its essential form is that that petitions be instituted fully
as to all patent claims or not at all.7o The difference matters because a
"challenge,"7' as the PTAB guidance uses that term, may consist of more than
just a patent claim that is being attacked. A challenge may also include each
statutory basis asserted for the invalidity of the patent claim, or the prior art
cited as evidence of the claim's invalidity, or both. In short, a challenge for
PTAB purposes may be defined at different levels of generality, each with its
own implications for agency workload as well as agency obligations of
reasoned decision making.
Consider, for example, an inter partes review petition that seeks to
invalidate only two patent claims, by a petitioner who challenges each claim
on both available statutory grounds for invalidity (lack of novelty under 35
U.S.C. § 102 and lack of nonobviousness under § 103)72 and who cites two
pieces of prior art, Reference A and Reference B.
Focusing, as SAS Institute does, on the patent claims challenged in the
petition would give the PTAB only two arguments to consider:
1.

Claim i is invalid; and

2.

Claim

2

is invalid.

Focusing, in somewhat more detail, both on patent claims and on
relevant statutory grounds for asserting invalidity would give the PTAB four
arguments to consider:

65. Id.
66. Id.
67.
Guidanceon the Impact ofSAS on AIA Trial Proceedings, USPTO (Apr. 26, 2o 18) [hereinafter
PTAB Guidance], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance-on the-impact
of saston_aitrialproceedings_%2o(april_26_2o18).pdf [https://penna.cc/8Z88-ERCK].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352-53 (2018).
71.
PTAB Guidance, supra note 67.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 3 1 (b) (2012).
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1.

Claim 1 lacks novelty (§ 102);

2.

Claim i is obvious (§ 103);

3.

Claim

2

lacks novelty (§ 102); and

4.

Claim

2

is obvious (§ 103).
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And finally, focusing in greatest detail on claims, statutory grounds, and
prior art would give the PTAB-even in this trivial example-as many as ten
arguments for purposes of an institution decision:
i.

Claim i lacks novelty (§ 102) based on Reference A;

2.

Claim i lacks novelty (§ 102) based on Reference B;

3.

Claim i is obvious (§ 103) based on Reference A;

4.

Claim i is obvious (§ 103) based on Reference B; and

5.

Claim i is obvious (§ 103) based on combining References

A and B.
6.

Claim

2

lacks novelty (§

1o)

based on Reference A;

7.

Claim

2

lacks novelty (§

1o)

based on Reference B;

8.

Claim

2

is obvious (§ 103) based on Reference A;

9.

Claim

2

is obvious (§ 103) based on Reference B; and

10. Claim 2 is obvious (§ 103) based on combining References

A and B.
As this example reveals, conceptualizing "challenges" in broad, general terms
reduces the number of distinct arguments the PTAB must consider, and viceversa. The more distinct arguments the PTAB must consider, the higher its
trial workload will be and the more fully it will have to explain its final
decision. Coming on the heels of a defeat in SAS Institute, where the Patent
Office had staked out a firmly minimalist view of those very obligations, why
would it now issue guidance that goes even further beyond what the Court
required?
There are at least two plausible explanations, and both reflect
institutional caution. One is that the agency, freshly chastened by the Court,
is now interested in leaving no doubts about its compliance. Indeed, this is
consistent with the full language of the Patent Office regulation that
authorized partial institution:
(a) When instituting interpartes review, the Board may authorize the
review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or
some of the grounds of unpatentabilityassertedfor each claim.
(b) At any time prior to institution of inter partes review, the Board
may deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the

2656
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challenged claims. Denial of a ground is a Board decision not to
institute interpartesreview on that ground.73
Having earned the Court's disapproval in cherry-picking among patent
claims, the Patent Office may have lost its political appetite for cherry-picking
among grounds for unpatentability as well.74

The other explanation, which is not mutually exclusive to the first, is that
looking to claims alone does not adequately describe the workload associated
with the case or the necessary fullness of the eventual agency decision. The
key premise of the example above, after all, is that the true depth of a given
case must account for two things. One is the set of patent claims that the
petitioner challenges. The other is the set of statutory grounds that the
petitioner asserts and the prior art evidence that the petitioner cites in
support. Regardless of how general or specific the conceptualization of the
issues involved, the analytical work actually to be done remains the same. And
wherever on this spectrum the Patent Office chooses to specify how it will
approach PTAB cases, the agency should state its choice and explain it.
The reason is that the Patent Office, like all administrative agencies, is
obliged to reach its conclusions by reasoned decision making.75 In general,
this means there must be rationality in the process of deciding, not that the
decision itself must be correct.7 6 Accordingly, the Patent Office must strike a
balance between the benefits of reducing its workload by framing PTAB issues
in general terms and the costs of potential reversal by the Federal Circuit for
failing to frame the issues specifically enough to support its conclusions fully.
In fact, the Patent Office has good reason to fear such reversals. In a
recent string of appeals from the PTAB, the Federal Circuit has been sending
cases back to the agency for further explanation.77 The basis for these
remands is the familiar Chenery doctrine, which holds that courts can uphold
agency action only on the grounds that the agency itself has articulated, not

37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2018) (emphasis added). The regulation governing institution of
73.
post-grant review and covered business method review corresponds fully to that of inter partes
review. See id. § 42.208.
74. The initial Federal Circuit response to this agency caution seems positive. In PGS
Geophysical AS v. Iancu, a nonprecedential panel decision held that SAS Institute requires the
patent claims being challenged and the grounds for the challenge to be treated equally for
institution purposes. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F. 3 d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A
month later in Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., the Federal Circuit reiterated that conclusion from PGS
GeophysicalAS, this time in a precedential opinion. Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., 894 F. 3 d 1256, 1258
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
75.

76.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89

29,

57 (1983).
L. REV. 499,

TEX.

529-30 (2011).
77. See Arista Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 726 F. App'x 787, 788 (Fed. Cir. 2018);
Rovalma, SA v. Bohler-Edelstahl GMBH & Co. KG, 856 F-3 d 1og,
1021 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F-3 d 987,989 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In reNuvasive, Inc.,
842 F. 3 d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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on other adequate grounds that the court itself might find satisfactory.7 8
Appropriately, Chenery itself is also a bulwark of reasoned decision making by
agencies, ensuring that courts respect even agencyjudgments with which they
disagree-so long as those judgments are rooted in transparent and
defensible explanations.79
Thus, it seems likely that the Patent Office's commitment to institute
review on all "challenges" refers not only to patent claims but also to
arguments of law (i.e., the available statutory grounds for invalidity). It might
additionally refer to arguments of fact such as prior art, though this would
push reason-giving to its maximum, with no cost savings from conceptualizing
"challenges" for institution purposes even somewhat narrowly.
C.

CURRENTLY PENDING CASES

More problematic than future petitions are currently pending cases in
which the PTAB has already made partial institutions. The guidance that the
Patent Office issued just after SAS Institutestates a policy that seems surprising
at first. Where a partial institution is already in place, says the guidance, "the
panel may issue an order supplementing the institution decision to institute
on all challenges raised in the petition."so Now that PTAB institution is a
binary, all-or-nothing matter, the PTAB may retroactively institute the rest of
the petition. What makes this approach surprising is its discretion.
After SAS Institute, it might seem that the PTAB must institute the
additional challenged claims, but this is not so for two reasons. First, though
the guidance does not spell it out, the PTAB may also deny the entire petition,
including what it had previously instituted, and terminate the proceeding.
Retroactively granting-all and retroactively denying-all are equally permissible
because of the "may not/unless" structure of the institution standard. As
discussed above, this framing makes a reasonable likelihood of success a
necessary condition.', SAS Institutenow makes clear that it is not a sufficient
one. Once the standard is met, whether or not to institute is discretionary:
"The text says only that the Director can decide 'whether' to institute the
requested review-not 'whether and to what extent' review should proceed."8 2
The Court also notes that "the language anticipates a regime where a
reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies review of all."8 3 The
language is telling. Under these circumstances, review is justified but not
compelled.

78.
79.
8o.
81.
82.

83.

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 8o, 88 (1943).
Levy & Glicksman, supranote 76, at 530.
PTAB Guidance, supranote 67 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 13 8 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (emphasis in original).
Id.
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Moreover, the parties themselves may render further PTAB action moot.
A joint request to terminate the case has multiple benefits. The settling
petitioner in such a case can escape without estoppel attaching4 In
exchange, the patent owner can likely end the inter partes review altogether.
Such a bargain is even more likely in cases where the PTAB has not yet
reached the merits or sunk significant decision costs into the case.
To be sure, the PTAB can proceed to a final written decision even if all
petitioners have settled and dropped out.8 5 However, in this type of situation
above all, it makes little sense for the PTAB to disregard party settlement and
force itself forward to a final written decision. If it did so, the panel would
have to adjudicate claims on which it had previously denied institution,
expecting at the time that it would not have to issue any decision at all. Indeed,
that was precisely the agency's litigation position in SAS Institute itself.86 Quiet
resolution of these cases is likely to be attractive not only to the parties but
also to the PTAB.
D.

ITIGANT INCENTIVES

Finally, while currently pending cases are resolved, potential petitioners
face an ongoing choice about whether to mount new challenges and, if so,
how to do it. For them, SAS Institute raises the stakes considerably. To be clear,
these higher stakes are separate from cost constraints, including the PTAB fee
increase that took effect in late 2017, before the SAS Institute decision was
even handed down. 8 7 They are also separate from more longstanding
constraints such as page limits on petitions, which are difficult to circumvent
only as far as they impose the additional cost of filing more petitions in order
88
to make all desired arguments.
Before SAS Institute, petitioners faced little reason not to be overinclusive
in their challenges. Full denials were possible, but the routine usage of partial
institution meant that the risk-reward calculus could be split. Meritorious
arguments could go forward on their own, and failed arguments were no real
loss because the estoppel effects were murky at best. Going forward, however,
even petitions that contain meritorious arguments might fail in their entirety.
After SAS Institute, the PTAB faces the responsibility of writing a final
written decision as to every claim challenged and has additionally assumed
responsibility for every challenge in the petition.8 9 The Federal Circuit's
increased interrogation of agency reasoning means that these responsibilities

84. 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (2012).
85. Id.
86. Brief for the Federal Respondent, SAS Inst, 138 S. CL 1348 (No. 16-969), 2017 WL
3948437, at *30.
87. Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Finalizes Revised Patent Fee Schedule (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-finalizes-revised-patent-fee-schedule.
88. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2016).
89. PTAB Guidance, supra note 67.
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also require more thorough explanations, under Chenery, in the PTAB's final
written decisions90 As a result, petitioners would do well to focus their
petitions. Whether in the context of choosing which patent claims to
challenge, which statutory grounds to assert, and which prior art to cite, PTAB
petitioners must now seek a difficult balance that the Patent Office never
required them to seek before. Petitioners must now try to ensure that the
likelihood of full institution is greater than the likelihood of full denial.
IV.

TowARD MORE EFFICIENT PTAB ADMINISTRATION

In this changed landscape, the likely incentive of the Patent Office is to
deny institution more often, at least for the time being. The Court's opinion
has no effect on the PTAB's ability to grant full institutions. PTAB panels
could already do so and still can. What they now confront is the prospect of
granting full institution even where arguments in the petition lack merit. It is
no longer possible to filter out these potentially unavailing arguments at the
outset, where estoppel would at least arguably not attach. Instead, the only
way to entertain any arguments is to adjudicate all arguments-even the
plainly deficient ones-with all the Chenery obligations of reason-giving and
the full scope of estoppel that it imposes on the petitioner. This requirement
represents a potentially significant increase in the PTAB's workload.
A.

CASELOAD EFFECTS OFPARTIAL INSTITUTION

The magnitude of this increased workload merits closer scrutiny. Until
now, the Patent Office has largely based its estimates on the number of
pending cases (i.e., the number of petitions filed).o' Looking with more
granularity and detail at the content of those petitions, however, reveals just
how much unappreciated filtering work partial institution has been doing
until now. This Section presents the results of an empirical study of each of
the nearly 6,ooo interpartes review petitions in which the PTAB had rendered
institution decisions starting from the beginning of AIA review through April
2018-when the SAS Institutedecision ended partial institution.92
As an initial matter, the agency's reliance on case-level measures has led
it to understate the scope of partial institution. At the level of case petitions
filed, the total shares of petitions that were fully instituted, partially instituted,

go.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 8o, 94-95 (1943).
gi.
Chat with the Chief SAS Guidance for ALA Tial ProceedingsAfter Supreme Court Decision,
USPTO (Apr. 30, 2018, 12:oo PM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patenttrial-and-appeal-board/oil-states-and-sas-decisions-supreme-court (discussed during the questionand-answer session).
92. PTAB data was analyzed from Docket Navigator. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR,
http://docketnavigator.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2019). Although Docket Navigator does not
permit republication of its data, researchers can obtain access and replicate this study fairly
readily. See generallyVishnubhakat et al., supranote 1, app. A at 84 (discussing data and replication
from Docket Navigator in Appendix A).
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Given the claim-by-claim approach that the PTAB itself advocated in
defense of partial institution for so long, it would seem appropriate to parse
workload more finely, at least at the level of claims challenged within a case.
For example, a case involving thirty challenged patent claims on which
institution was fully granted presents quite a different workload than a case
involving only ten challenged claims on which institution was only partly
granted.
The grounds on which patent claims are challenged also matter,
especially in light of the Federal Circuit's renewed push to elicit fuller and
more reasoned decision making in PTAB cases.9s An argument about the
novelty requirement for patentability generally rests on a single prior art
reference,94 whereas an argument about the nonobviousness requirements
generally rests on a combination of multiple prior art references.9 6 These, too,
present quite different workloads for a panel of PTAB judges.
Thus, in empirically exploring the workload associated with PTAB cases
and with the work of partial institution as a filter, it is appropriate under the
circumstances to take as the unit of observation each combination of patent
claim and asserted legal ground for unpatentability. For example, an inter
partes review petition challenging ten patent claims each on novelty and
nonobviousness grounds represent twenty claim-ground pairs.
This more detailed definition of workload results reveals, surprisingly,
that the use of partial institution prior to SAS Institute had been cutting the
agency's workload substantially. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that out of all
the claim-ground pairs that came before the PTAB in inter partes review
petitions on which the PTAB made a partial institution decision until April
2018, the PTAB accepted 6o.8% and rejected the remaining 39.2% as
unmeritorious. This finding is also consistent across technologies.

93.
94.

95.
96.

See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).

Id. § 103.
Compare Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., 909 F. d 398, 405
3

(Fed. Cir. 2018) (discussing single-reference anticipation), withRealtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912

F-3 d 1368, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (discussing multi-reference obviousness).
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expressly contemplates full denial of a petition, except that the PTAB in its
decision to deny institution would also identify which claims were worthy of
review and which claims were not99 Petitioners could then refile in light of
that advisory information. Justice Ginsburg described this exercise as the
PTAB "spend[ing] its time so uselessly"'oo-in contrast simply to allowing
partial institutions and reaching the same point without the added step of
refiling.
This is not only a reasonable idea but also one that comports with agency
obligations of reasoned decision making.o Petitioners are now obliged to

pare down their challenges in order to balance the hope of full institution
against the risk of full denial, but they do not make this choice in a vacuum.
The PTAB also has a valuable-indeed, necessary-role to play.
Decisions to grant review already explain what arguments the panel has
found meritorious in order that the parties, especially the patent owner, have
clear and ample notice of the issues to be litigated.-o= Now after SAS Institute,
the PTAB can do the same to explain in its denials of institution precisely what
it finds worthy or unworthy of review, and why.o3 By channeling petitioners
"to file new or amended petitions shorn of challenges the Board finds
unworthy,"104 the PTAB can generate both static and dynamic benefits. In
cases already filed, these reasoned denials would be a roadmap for petitioners
to craft petitions without undue guesswork.
In cases to come, other petitioners would also have had the benefit of
earlier decisions, enabling them to file challenges that are more likely in the
first place to be fully granted than fully denied. In particular, the realigned
incentive of the PTAB to reject overinclusive and repetitive petitioning would
do much to discourage those behaviors among petitioners. These were
especially pernicious habits that partial institution cultivated in petitioners for
the simple reason that the PTAB had a way to manage its workload without
having to discipline extravagant petitioners. That is no longer the case. Now
when the PTAB allows a petitioner to bring a patent owner into AIA review,
the defensive burden that the patent owner faces is more closely connected
to the workload than the PTAB itself faces.

99.
1oo.
101.

Id. at 1360 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.

io2. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,757 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R Pt. 42). From the beginning, the PTAB has made a practice of setting
forth with specificity in its institution decisions both the scope of review and the reasons for
instituting review-and has allowed dissatisfied parties to seek rehearing accordingly. See id. at
48,757, 48,765Under current practice, a decision not to institute review is expected to "contain [only]
103.
a short statement as to why the standards [for instituting review] were not met," and even "this
may not be necessary in all cases." Id. at 48,765.
SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104.
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UPCOMING QUESTIONS FOR TIElhDERAL CIRCUIT

C.

The Court's mandate in SAS Institute raises important procedural
questions about how to reconcile administrative adjudication of patent
validity with the need for binary institution decisions. Having rejected the
expansive Patent Office claim to nonappealable discretion,05 however, the
Court has also endorsed a jurisdictional rule of vigorous appellate oversight
of the PTAB.'- This is entirely appropriate. The stable and predictable
substitution of expert agency adjudication for slower and costlier district court
litigation is more likely to arise if the procedural answers to post-SAS Institute
questions bear the imprimatur of the Federal Circuit and are not merely the
transient policy preferences of the Patent Office.
Two questions are especially likely to command prompt attention. One
is the scope of the one-year time bar, which compels district-court defendants
in a patent infringement case to seek inter partesreview within a year or forgo
it altogether.o7 Another is the decision of a district court to stay its hand
pending resolution of an interpartes review or other PTAB proceeding on the
same patent.ios

1.

Inter PartesReview's One-Year Time Bar

Litigants are likely to dispute the scope of the one-year time bar
particularly soon in the wake of SAS Institute because a denial of institution
may not leave the petitioner enough time to refile within the one-year
deadline.-o The question then is what happens when a party timely files its
petition in the first place, the PTAB plans to deny review, and the one-year
deadline has passed in the meantime. Can, and should, the PTAB in such
cases allow the petitioner to refile notwithstanding the time bar? The question
is unsettled, but the answer is probably no.
The reason why this issue is likely to arise lies in the power-allocation
function of the one-year time bar, which is an important structural border
provision in the AIA's substitution of agency adjudication for judicial
process.,o The one-year clock begins when a party (or its privy or real party
in interest) "is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.""

105.
1o6.

See supra text accompanying note 57.
SASInst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358-60.
107.
3 5 U.S.C. § 3 1 5 (b) (2012).
io8. The power to grant stays is an inherentjudicial power in the discretion of the court. See
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 5 4 9 F. 3 d 842, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1og.
Certainly, there would be no immediate estoppel effect of the denial. Although
institution decisions are made "final" by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 3 14 (d), estoppel upon both future
agency proceedings and future court proceedings arises only when a case "results in a final written
decision under section 3 18(a)." Id. § 3 15(e). Such final written decisions, in turn, can come only
in cases where "inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed." Id. § 318(a).
110.
Vishnubhakat, supra note 47, at o82, 1086-87.
111.
3 5 U.S.C.§ 3 15 (b).
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Prior research confirms that, when measuring the lag from prior district-court
litigation to an eventual inter partes review petition on the same patent, the
large majority do fall within a one-year window.m As Figures 8 and 9
demonstrate, for the lag between first district-court case to first petition,
76.6% of patents come within the one-year window."3 For the lag between
last pre-PTAB district-court case to first petition, the share is 88.6%."4 Most
importantly, a large share of parties seeking inter partes review wait as long as
possible, filing right at the one-year mark."1
Figure 8. Lag from First District-Court Case to First Inter PartesReview
Petition, in Years"'6
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Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 1, at 75-76.

Id. at 76, 105 fig.17; see infta Figure8.
et al., supra note i, at 76, 1o6 fig.18; see infra Figure 9.
Vishnubhakat
114.
115. Vishnubhakat et al., supranote 1, at 76 (describing a modal spike at one year according
to both measures). One might ask why any portion of these distributions might exceed the oneyear deadline. The answer is that these measures look only at court-agency lags as to the same
patent and not necessarily the same parties. Non-standard petitioners who have not been sued in
district court at all would not appear in the distribution. Id. at 75.
116. Id.ato5fig.17.
113.
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Figure 9. Lag from Last Pre-InterPartesReview District Court Case to First
Inter PartesReview Petition"7

14%

As for how the issue might be resolved, there are at least two colorable
theories on which petitioners might seek leave to refile notwithstanding the
time bar, and why the PTAB might think itself empowered to entertain such
123
requests. However, neither is ultimately persuasive. The first, more intuitive
theory is that the time bar is like a statute of limitations and might be subject
to tolling. This theory fails because of the general rule that a limitation period
can be tolled within a court's equitable discretion only if the time limit is nonjurisdictional in nature." 8 Failure to comply with ajurisdictional time bar, on
the other hand, "deprives a court of all authority to hear a case.""o The
Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom suggests that the
2
one-year time bar for inter partes review is, indeed, jurisdictional in nature. o
As the en banc majority explained, satisfying the time bar "is a condition
precedent to the Director's authority to act"121 and "sets limits on the
Director's statutory authority to institute, balancing various public
interests."22 Judge O'Malley, writing separately, put the point even more
plainly, framing the time bar as a matter of the PTAB's "statutory
It is also instructive to consider how the law treats the initial district-court
complaint that starts the one-year clock itself. In Click-to-Call v. Ingeni, the
117.
118.

iig.
120.

121.
122.
123.

Id. at io6 fig.i8.
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. CL. 1625, 1630--31 (2015) (en banc).
Id.at 1631.
Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F. 3 d 1364, 1371--72 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1380 (Hughes,J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1374 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1375-76 (O'Malley,J., concurring).
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Federal Circuit recently held that the voluntary dismissal of a prior districtcourt complaint does not reset the one-year clock for filing a petition seeking
interpartes review.1 Prior case law had hinted that such dismissals might reset
the clock, recognizing "the effect of dismissals without prejudice as leaving
the parties as though the action had never been brought."125 An en banc
majority of the court, however, agreed that leaving the parties as if the
intervening action had never been brought is a reason to apply the time bar
as is-not to toll it indefinitely.". 6 By a similar logic, if a denial of institution is
viewed as equivalent to a dismissal that leaves the parties as though the case
had never been brought, then presumably the time bar should apply as is.
The second theory fares no better. Rather than denying institution
through an outright dismissal, the PTAB might grant the petitioner leave to
amend its petition, as courts often do when facing motions to dismiss.127
Allowing amendments to a petition would spare the PTAB the need to dismiss
an entire case, including meritorious arguments, where the one-year time bar
would forbid refiling the case "shorn of challenges the Board finds
unworthy."128 This would certainly show solicitude for petitioners who have
invested in testing the validity of patents, a policy position that the Patent
Office might plausibly adopt. It would also mirror the modem judicial policy
to "freely give leave when justice so requires,",29 a policy whose justifications
include solicitude for certain favored categories of litigants, such as pro se
plaintiffs. 130
Meanwhile, the potential burden to patent owners of having to defend
their patent rights against later-raised arguments is not necessarily an
insurmountable obstacle. Just as amendments in civil litigation may come
24

124.

SeeClick-ToCall Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3 d 1321, 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

125. E.g., Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F. 3 d 1293, 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); see also Bonneville Assocs., Ltd. P'ship v. Barram, 165 F. 3 d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1999). However, because then-controlling precedent held that PTAB determinations about the

one-year time bar were nonappealable, the issue remained unresolved. Shaw Indus. Grp., 899 F.3 d
at 1301 (citing Achates Reference Publ'g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F-3 d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
The en banc opinion in Wi-Fi One reversed Achates and concluded that the time bar is within the

Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367. Indeed, this was what
precipitated rehearing in Click-To-Call Click-To-Call Techs., 899 F-3 d at 1324-25.
126.

See Click-To-Call Techs., 899 F. 3 d at 1335.

127.

128.

SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1360 (2018) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).

129.

FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2).

See, e.g., Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F. 3 d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (remanding a prisoner's
130.
legal challenge because the lower court applied an unnecessarily-stringent standard of pleading
to his complaint); El v. Wehling, 548 F. App'x 750, 752-53 ( 3 d Cir. 2013) (remanding a pro se
plaintiffs case to allow him to amend his complaint for a fourth time); Eldridge v. Block, 832
F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987) (observing that Rule 15 "is applied even more liberally to
pro se litigants"); cf Thomas A. Reuland, Note, Rule i5 :A Limited Safety Net for 12(B)(6) Dismissal
Afterlqbal, 96 lowAL. REv. 1403, 14og n.33 (2011) (reading Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam) to "suggest[] that courts must not forget that the limits of notice pleading
depend on whether the litigant is pro se").
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after a statute of limitations but can nevertheless relate back to the date of the
original pleading in certain circumstances,' 3 amendments to an inter partes
review petition could be conditioned on finding that the original petition
provided enough notice to the patent owner so as not to inflict undue
prejudice.132
Ultimately, the risk in allowing petitions to be amended as a way around
the one-year time bar is that recent case law is unclear whether the PTAB has
the authority to do it. Unlike the liberaljoinder rules of federal civil litigation
that generally allow "as many claims as [a party] has" to be introduced into a
pleading,'ss the adjudicatory powers of the Patent Office are enumerated by
statute and were consciously designed as a zero-sum substitute for the power
of district courts to adjudicate patent validity. 134 The agency cannot enlarge
its domain to balance fairness and prejudice between petitioners and patent
owners without intruding upon the domain of the courts-indeed, intruding
upon the allocation of power that Congress already put in place through
structural border provisions such as the one-year time bar itself.135 The
Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom recognized the
gravity of this balance and forcefully rejected Patent Office attempts to
reallocate power to itself at the expense of the courts.'s 6 That said, the issues
at stake in Wi-Fi One were whether the Federal Circuit could review the PTAB's
application of the one-year time bar and whether the PTAB's application was
correct with regard to real parties in interest. For the distinct question of how
the PTAB applies the time bar to amended petitions, the Federal Circuit
would almost surely find judicial reviewability again but might view the
correctness of the PTAB's position differently.
Still, in all, the Court's decision in SAS Institute counsels against an
amended-petition workaround to the one-year time bar. Fundamentally, the
encouragement of liberal amendment's7 and liberal joinder's 8 in civil
litigation are rooted in the modern preference for a unitary form of action

FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c).
See generally 6iB AM.JUR. 2D Pleading§ 804, Westlaw (database updated February 2019)
(discussing prejudice to the non-amending party as a factor counseling against amendment and
the desirability of allowing amendment when such prejudice is not asserted and proven).
131.

132.

133.

FED.R.CIV.P.18(a).

134.

Vishnubhakat et al., supra note i, at 49-50.

135. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 47, at 1075-78, 1o81-83 (discussing power allocation
between the courts and the Patent office through structural border provisions of the AIA);
Amicus Curiae Brief of the N.Y. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n in Support of Neither Party at 14,
Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F. 3 d 1364 (2018) (Nos. 2015-1944, -1945, -1946), 2017
WL 694463, at *14.
Wi-F One, 878 F. 3 d at 1374 (noting that, "like § 315 as a whole, [the one-year time bar]
136.
governs the relation of IPRs to other proceedings or actions, including actions taken in district court").
137. FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a).
138.

Id.R18(a).
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without procedural distinctions or different modes of seeking relief.'39 In
other words, if two civil actions that might otherwise be filed separately are
related enough to be litigated together, they should be.140 Importantly, this
does not give courts jurisdiction that they would not otherwise have, but
merely encourages the exercise of existing powers in ways that "secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."'4'

Thus, even if this analytical framework were to be applied to the PTAB to
permit amending petitions and joining arguments merely as a way of
consolidating multiple cases that would have been brought instead, the
analogy would still fail. The Court in SAS Institute already expressly ejected the
Patent Office's attempt to curate the contents of a petition in the PTAB. 142
Moreover, the text of the AIA, which specifically provides for joinder of
multiple inter partes reviews by the same or different parties, limits such
joinders only to petitions that are each independently determined to warrant
institution.143 The agency simply does not have the broad adjudicatory
discretion that courts have in civil litigation.

The upshot is that petitioners who file close to the one-year deadline and
are denied institution after the deadline has passed are likely to be timebarred from refiling, as are their privies and real parties in interest.
Nevertheless, others may learn from the PTAB's opinion explaining the
denial, and this remains a valuable reason for the agency to engage in
reasoned decision-making.
2.

Judicial Stays Pending PTAB Review

Beyond the one-year time bar, the end of partial institution is also likely
to push a renewed interest in seeking stays of district-court litigation pending
PTAB review, especially inter partes review. Most of this interest will naturally
be directed to district courts themselves, which "have broad discretion to
manage their dockets, including the power to grant a stay of proceedings." 44

See id. R. 2; ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF CIVIL
139.
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (1937), https://www.us

courts.gov/sites/default/files/frimport/CVo

4 -1 9 37.pdf.
140. This is one of the basic conclusions in the broader procedural debate over what should,
as a theoretical matter, constitute the "basic litigation unit." See, e.g., Michael D. Conway,
Comment, Narrowingthe Scope of Rule 13(a), 6o U. CHI. L. REV. 141, 145 n.21 (1993); Douglas D.
McFarland, Seeing the Forestfor the Trees: The Transaction or Occurrence and the Claim Interlock Civil
Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTALL.REV. 247, 276 (2oxi).

141.

FED. R. CI. P.

1.

SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018).
35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2012).
144. Murata Mach. USAv. Daifuku Co., Ltd., 830 F.3 d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting
Procter & Gamble v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 549 F. 3 d 842, 848-49 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Procter
Gamble, 549 F-3 d at 848-49 (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)); Gould
v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
&

142.
143.
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The end of partial institution after SAS Institute, however, will especially affect
two of the factors that district courts weigh in deciding whether to stay a patent
case pending PTAB review of the same patent. This impact, in turn, is likely
to invite Federal Circuit oversight on whether district courts are taking the
change in circumstances after SAS Institute into account enough not to
constitute an abuse of discretion.
In weighing a stay pending interpartesreview, district courts generally seek
to simplify the issues involved, to avoid letting costs already sunk into the
litigation before them go to waste, and to minimize prejudice to the nonmoving party.145 Indeed, together with a fourth factor-"reduc[ing] the
burden of litigation on the parties and on the court"-this standard is actually
required to be considered where the co-pending PTAB proceeding is a
covered business method review.' 6 As a result, this fourth factor has begun to
inform district court stays for interpartesreview as well.'47 The Federal Circuit,
for its part, approves this cross-fertilization as being well within the sound
discretion of district courts. 148
Partial institution, by its very nature, made this flexible, discretionary
standard hard to apply. Where some patent claims and arguments were
admitted for review and others were excluded, the degree to which a PTAB
judgment would simplify litigation would necessarily be incremental. This is
over and above the structural limits on how much inter partes review can
overlap with Article III litigation, as inter partes review can consider legal
arguments only about anticipation and obviousness and prior art evidence
consisting only of patents and printed publications.'49
It is little surprise, then, that district courts around the country grant stays
with high variability, more than 70% in the Northern District of California
and less than 40% in the Eastern District of Texas.'so As with estoppel, partial
institution took an existing problem with PTAB review and made it even
worse.'s' In fact, growing awareness of this variability-and apparently
See, e.g., Murata, 83o F. 3 d at 1361.
146. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2o 1, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b) (i) (D), 125 Stat.
284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2011)).
147. Anne S. Layne-Farrar, The Cost of Doubling Up: An Economic Assessment of Duplication in
PTAB Proceedings and Patent Infringement Litigation, A.B.A.: LANDSLIDE (May 1, 2018), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual-propertyaw/publications/landslide/2017-18/mayjune/cost-doubling-up. Recent commentary seems to support this use of the fourth CBM stay
factor in interpartes review as a way of advancing the overall substitutionary purpose of the PTAB.
See, e.g.,Joel Sayres &Julie WahIstrand, To Stay or Not to Stay PendingfIR? That Should Be a Simpler
Question. 17 CHI.-KENTJ. INTELL. PROP. 52, 63-65 (2o18).
148. Murata, 830 F. 3 d at 1362.
35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
149.
Sayres & WahIstrand, supra note 147, at 55. There is also additional variation among
150.
individual judges. Id. (citing DocketNavigator, Success Rates on Requests to Stay PendinglPR, CBM,
orPGR through 2017, DOCKETREPORT (Apr. 3, 2018), http://docketreport.blogspot.com/2os8/
145.

04 /success-rates-on-requests-to-stay.html).
See supra Section IIB.
151.
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growing uncertainty about how useful PTAB review would prove to be to
courts-has also coincided with an overall decrease in the granting of stays,
from about 8o% over the 2011-2014 period to about 70% over the 2o1
-2016 period.152 Now that institution decisions must fully grant or fully deny

a petition, both inter partes review and covered business method review
suddenly represent a far clearer signal from the PTAB about what issues stand
to be simplified if the agency grants review, and vice-versa.
Moreover, beyond the simplification of issues, a court's evaluation of
costs already sunk into litigation, through discovery and the setting of a trial
date, is also likely to be affected by SAS Institute. Where the PTAB institutes a
petition in full, even a case that is somewhat far down the litigation timeline
may still benefit from a stay because the savings from a likely invalidation in
the PTAB could be greater than the additional judicial resources that would
be spent if the court declined a stay.'53 The PTAB can do much to strengthen
the quality of this informational signal from the agency to the courts by
explaining its reasoning in decisions to grant or deny institution even more
fully than it already does.54
The propriety of how district courts use this clearer information from the
agency about simplification and sunk litigation cost could come before the
Federal Circuit in two ways. One is ordinary appeal following a final judgment,
which is naturally likely to follow a decision to deny, rather than grant, a stay.
The other is interlocutory appeal immediately upon the grant or denial of a
stay. Interlocutory review is a meaningful possibility in the face of a copending PTAB case. For covered business method reviews, Congress expressly
provided such immediate appeal, with de novo oversight from the Federal
Circuit "to ensure consistent application of established precedent."155
For inter partes review, meanwhile, interlocutory jurisdiction is available
where the district court's decision about a stay materially affects some other
issue over which interlocutory appeal would otherwise be available, such as a
motion for preliminary injunction.5 6 In Procter & Gamble v. Kraft Foods, for
example, the district court granted alleged infringer Kraft Foods's motion to
stay the infringement litigation pending inter partes reexamination of the

MORGAN LEWIS, 2017 PTAB DIGEST: THE LATEST TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN POST152.
GRANT PROCEEDINGS 26 (2017), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/publication/
report/ptab-post-grant-proceedingsfin screen.ashx; Layne-Farrar, supranote 147 (citing Brian
J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.

DIALOGUE 93, 94 (2014)).
The correlation of a decision to grant PTAB review with a likelihood of invalidating the
153.
patent is not only empirically verified but also, of course, built into the statutory criteria

themselves, which require "a reasonable likelihood" of petitioner success for inter pantes review
and a preponderant likelihood of petitioner success for covered business method review. 35
U.S.C. H§ 314(a), 324(a).
155.

See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
Program for Covered Business Method Patents).
3 5 U.S.C. § 321 note (Transitional

156.

Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1981).

154.
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patent that Procter & Gamble had asserted.'57 Procter & Gamble had sought
a preliminary injunction, which the district court denied as moot in light of
its stay, and the Federal Circuit concluded that it had interlocutory
jurisdiction.15 8 Thus, for a party who loses in district court over whether a stay
should have been issued pending interpartes review, it is paramount to be able
to show that the decision would have "serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence" or "cannot effectually be reviewed after the trial."'59
In both contexts, post-judgment appeal as well as interlocutory appeal,
the Federal Circuit will face essentially the same question: whether the district
court has taken adequate account of the dramatic change in Patent Office
practice following SAS Institute. Agency decisions to grant review should, at
the margin, correspond to a greater likelihood of a judicial decision to grant
a stay, and vice-versa. It would be appropriate, then, for Federal Circuit review
to take this expectation as a baseline for evaluating the district court's exercise
of discretion, though particular case facts might always justify a departure.
Similarly, as to the expenditure and timeline of litigation costs for
weighing a stay, an institution decision generally comes six months after filing,
with three months for the patent owner's preliminary response and another
three months for the PTAB to determine, 6 o based on the petition and the
response, whether review is appropriate.' 6' In light of this relatively stable
agency schedule, the Federal Circuit could promote the substitutionary
efficiency of the AIA by rewarding, with affirmance, the stay decisions of
district courts that not only account for where the litigation calendar was at
the time but also set the litigation calendar with an eye toward concurrent
PTAB review in the first place., 62 Indeed, bellwether courts such as the Eastern
District of Texas, the Northern District of California, and the District of
Delaware might even cultivate a norm of calendaring patent cases to conserve
initial judicial resources where a PTAB petition is likely to be filed.

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 549 F-3 d 842, 844 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8).
157.
Inter partesreexamination was an earlier generation of patent validity reevaluation that the Patent
Office administered until the AIA replaced it with interpartesreview. SeeVishnubhakat et al., supra
note 1, at 57-58.
158. Procter & Gamble, 549 F. 3 d at 846 ("[T]he stay order, as implemented in this case, can
be deemed to have denied P & G's motion for a preliminary injunction, meets the Carson
requirements, and is therefore reviewable under [28 U.S.C.] § 1292(a) (1) and (c) (i).").
Id. (quoting Woodard v. Sage Prods., Inc., 818 F.2d 841, 851 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
35 U.S.C. § 313; 37 C.F.R. § 4 2.107(b) (2018).
161. 35 U.S.C. § 3 1 4 (b).
162. The effect of this approach will generally be limited to inter partes review, which is the
only AIA validity review that is constrained by a one-year time bar. Compareid. § 3 1 5 (b) (requiring
an interpartes review be filed within one year of the complaint), with id. § 325(a) (1) (showing that
post grant reviews are not subject to that same one-year time limit).
159.

160.
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CONCLUSION

Although the Court's decision in SAS Institute has undoubtedly upended
a cornerstone of PTAB administration, the overall effect on administrative
patent revocation is likely to be greater efficiency, in accordance with the
original intent of the ALA to substitute agency review for judicial review. The
initial Patent Office response has been sound, going further than the Court's
opinion might strictly have required, but the agency should exercise caution
as it proceeds. The Patent Office seems to have underappreciated the sheer
scale of the adjudicatory workload that partial institution was allowing it to
filter out. As a result, the stakes now of accepting petitions too liberally are
correspondingly high.
Ultimately, the virtue of ending partial institution is that it imposes
greater discipline both upon patent challengers and upon the agency that
evaluates their challenges. The PTAB's own workload is now directly
connected to the burdens that petitioners are allowed to impose upon patent
owners. Moreover, if the Patent Office takesJustice Ginsburg's mock proposal
seriously, as it should, the result will be a desirable increase in reasoned
decision-making by the PTAB from which current and future petitioners alike
can learn much about how to focus their arguments for success.
The opinion of the Court quite consciously concerned itself with
respecting the structural choices that Congress made in the AIA, for better or
worse, without interposing the Court's own policyjudgments about efficiency.
Nevertheless, and perhaps ironically, the SAS Institute decision will promote
efficiency after all.

